Four model of argument
Abstract
I will transfer to the theory of arguments two distinctions from the theory of reasons. Generalism in the theory of argument claims that the very possibility of arguing depends on a suitable supply of general rules that specify what kinds of conclusions can be drawn from what kinds of data, while particularism denies this. Applied to arguments, atomism holds that the parts of an argument completely determine its logical properties while holism rejects it. I will show, first, that premise-conclusion models are atomistic and particularist. I will then distinguish a simplified Toulmin model, that breaks down an argument into premises, conclusion and warrant, and an extended model, which incorporates conditions of exception or rebuttal, and I will argue that the simplified Toulmin model is atomistic and generalist, while the extended model is holistic and generalist. Finally, I will describe a modified version of the holistic and particularistic Toulmin model by resorting to Bader's modifiers and argumentation by parity of reasons.References
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